Behind the text of the Basic Law: some Constitutional Fundamentals by Chan, JMM
Title Behind the text of the Basic Law: some ConstitutionalFundamentals
Author(s) Chan, JMM
Citation The 2016 International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL)Roundtable, Melbourne, Australia, 2-3 May 2016.
Issued Date 2016
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/226548
Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
1 
 
Behind the Text of the Basic Law: Some Constitutional Fundamentals 
 
Prof Johannes M M Chan 
Faculty of Law 
The University of Hong Kong 
 
 
 
 
Every constitution is shaped by its unique history and the social and political 
circumstances of the country in which it operates.   Our understanding and 
interpretation of the constitution cannot be divorced from the social, political 
and historical contexts of the jurisdiction in which the constitution is to operate.  
At the same time, constitutions, by their very nature, can only contain general 
principles.  While they prescribe a general framework for assessing the 
constitutionality of executive acts and, in some jurisdictions, statutory 
provisions, a literal reading of the constitutional text in most cases does not 
provide an obvious answer to many constitutional issues before the courts.  By 
interpreting the constitution, the courts give life to the constitution.  Yet 
interpretation is rarely a neutral process.  In giving meaning to the general text 
of a constitution, the courts may from time to time rely on various fundamental 
values in our constitutional system.  Such fundamental values may not be readily 
visible from the text of the constitution.  Professor Lawrence Tribe, in his 
inspiring work, described these values as “The Invisible Constitution”. 1 This may 
be putting the case too high, for a constitution, visible or otherwise, suggests a 
coherent and structured system of values and principles.  It may be difficult to 
find such a coherent pattern for a young constitution such as the Basic Law in 
Hong Kong that is less than 25 years old.  Instead, this paper argues that some 
fundamental values, which I would call Constitutional Fundamentals, do exist 
behind the text.  These principles are interstitial, vague, and far from being 
coherent or structured, and may sometimes even be in conflict with one another.  
Nonetheless, they exist, guide and influence the development of the constitution.  
It is not the purpose of this paper to argue whether these principles are desirable 
or not, but simply to contend that they exist and are discernible, and this paper 
tries to identify some of these constitutional fundamentals that underline the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong. 
 
 
I. The Social, Political and Historical Contexts of the Basic Law 
 
Hong Kong was partially ceded and partially leased to Britain in the 19th century 
under three different treaties.  The common law system was transplanted to 
Hong Kong that was since governed by a relatively benign colonial regime.   
                                                        
* I am grateful to my colleague Ms Cora Chan for her insightful comments on an 
earlier draft of this article.  Any mistake remains, of course, my sole 
responsibility. 
1 Lawrence Tribe, The Invisible Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
2 
 
Traditionally it was a place of refuge for those who wanted to avoid civil unrest 
in Mainland China.  The population soared soon after the Second World War, and 
it remains today that about half of the population are migrants or refugees from 
the Mainland.   By the 1980s, Hong Kong has developed into one of the major 
financial centres in the world, with a GDP comparable to many developed 
countries and enjoying a high degree of freedom and liberty.   In contrast, China 
at that time had just emerged from the ten-year long Cultural Revolution, during 
which there were widespread persecutions and massive destruction of anything 
representing the establishment or considered to be non-conforming with the 
prevailing political ideology.  All universities were closed down during the 
Cultural Revolution.  By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the country 
was almost at the brink of bankruptcy and a stage of lawlessness.  Since 1978, 
the country embarked on a massive rebuilding process with very noticeable 
success.  In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was concluded under which 
China would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong under the principle of “One 
Country, Two Systems”.   Hong Kong would retain “a high degree of autonomy”, 
and would preserve its own legal, social and economic systems.  Mainland law 
and policies would not apply to Hong Kong, and fundamental rights would be 
guaranteed.  These promises were given effect by the Basic Law, which serves as 
the constitution of Hong Kong.  The Basic Law was promulgated by the National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) in April 1990.  On 1 
July 1997, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the PRC 
(“HKSAR”). 
 
It is not surprising that many people in Hong Kong did not feel confident 
about the future master, especially when half of the population were once 
refugees fleeing the Mainland and Communist rule.  Many provisions in the Basic 
Law were hence drafted with the Mainland system in mind, such as the right to 
freedom of choice of occupation,2 the freedom to engage in academic, literary 
and artistic creation,3 a right to judicial remedies,4 and the right to freely raise a 
family.5  Thus, there are two constant themes in the interpretation of the Basic 
Law, namely the preservation of the integrity of the common law system, 
including the enjoyment of liberty and freedom under the common law system, 
and the maintenance and continuity with the previous system. 
 
 
The Constitutional Context of the Basic Law 
 
Chapter 3 of the Basic Law provides for the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of Hong Kong Inhabitants.  Article 39 of the Basic Law provides that 
the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”) shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the 
                                                        
2 Art 33, Basic Law. 
3 Art 34.  Intellectuals were severely suppressed and widely persecuted for their 
writings during the Cultural Revolution. 
4 Art 35. 
5 Art 37. The one-child policy in the PRC was lifted only in 2015. 
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laws of the HKSAR.  The ICCPR, but not the ICESCR, was incorporated into the 
domestic law of the HKSAR by the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, which 
reproduced the substantive rights provisions of the ICCPR.6  The PRC has ratified 
the ICESCR, but not the ICCPR.   Article 39 further provides that any restriction of 
the rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall be prescribed by 
law and shall not contravene the ICCPR and the ICESCR as applied to Hong Kong. 
 
Soon after the Basic Law came into effect, the Hong Kong Court of Final 
Appeal has, in a series of cases, laid down the general approach to the 
interpretation of the Basic Law.  The courts must be vigilant in the protection of 
fundamental rights and should adopt a generous and purposive interpretation so 
as to give full measures to individual rights.  A literal, technical, narrow or rigid 
approach should be avoided.7  Any restriction on a fundamental right must be 
narrowly interpreted and rigorously examined.  Such restriction, in order to pass 
muster the constitutional requirements, must be prescribed by law and satisfy 
the tests of rationality and proportionality.  The burden of justification of any 
restriction rests on the Government.8 
 
The Court of Final Appeal noted that a purposive approach to 
interpretation is necessary “because a constitution states general principles and 
expresses purposes without condescending to particularity and definition of 
terms.”9  Hence, “gap and ambiguities are bound to arise and, in resolving them, 
the courts are bound to give effect to the principles and purposes declared in, 
and to be ascertained from, the constitution and relevant extrinsic materials.”10   
Not only must the courts consider the purpose of the instrument, but that it must 
also interpret the language of its text in the light of the context, “context being of 
particular importance in the interpretation of a constitutional instrument.”11  In 
this regard, it is interesting to note the observation of Sir Anthony Mason, a non-
permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal, made in an extra-judicial lecture, 
that “the lack of a fully democratic universal franchise and the relationship 
created by the Basic Law between a strong executive government and a weak 
legislature might suggest that the community and the media may place greater 
                                                        
6 The substantive rights provisions of the ICCPR, with the exception of the right 
of a child to a nationality and a replacement of “every citizen” by “every 
permanent resident” regarding the right to vote and to stand for election, were 
reproduced in Part II of the Bill of Rights Ordinance.  Part II is known as the Bill 
of Rights.  Reservations to the ICCPR that were entered into by the UK upon 
ratification of the ICCPR were reproduced in Part III of the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance. 
7 Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, pars 30. 
8 Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, paras 28-30; Leung 
Kwok Hung v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229, para 116; Yeung May Wan v HKSAR 
(2005) 8 HKCFAR 137, paras 1-3. 
9 Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, para 28, per Li CJ. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  For extrinsic materials, Li CJ specifically referred to the Joint Declaration. 
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expectations in the curial protection of individual rights and due process than is 
the case in other jurisdictions.”12   
 
In construing the Basic Law, the Hong Kong courts have been receptive to 
a wide range of international and comparative materials.13  This is partly due to 
the international origin of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, which is a replica of the 
ICCPR, and partly to the practice of having an overseas judge in every 
substantive hearing before the Court of Final Appeal, which includes a panel of 
distinguished overseas judges.  Thus, apart from case law from both overseas 
domestic jurisdictions and international tribunals such as the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the International Court of Justice, the 
courts have also freely referred to soft law such as General Comments and 
Concluding Observations of international treaty bodies, Reports of the Hong 
Kong Government to various international treaty bodies, the Siracusa Principles, 
the United States’ Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practice, as well as Brandeis-type of briefs on comparative legislation in the 
context of flag desecration law,14 or evidence of comparative medical research on 
sexual puberty in a claim for equality and privacy in relation to homosexual 
conduct, or the Joint Declaration in resolving a discrepancy in meaning between 
the English version and the Chinese version of the Basic Law.15  In Leung Kwok 
Hung v HKSAR, the Court of Final Appeal relied partly on the Government’s 
acceptance of a positive obligation in its period report to the Human Rights 
Committee pursuant to the ICCPR in upholding a positive obligation to assist the 
demonstrators to enjoy their right of peaceful assembly and demonstration.16   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 Sir Anthony Mason, “The Role of the Common Law in Hong Kong”, in Jessica 
Young and Rebecca Lee (eds), The Common Law Lecture Series 2005 (Faculty of 
Law, The University of Hong Kong, 2006), at p 20.  Sir Anthony specifically 
referred to Town Planning Board v Society for the Protection of the Harbour Ltd 
(2004) 7 HKCFAR 1 as an example of the public looking to the court as an arena 
for ventilation of grievances and redress when such issues would normally have 
been addressed and resolved in the political process in other jurisdictions.  
13 See J Chan, “Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights: Its Reception of and Contribution to 
International and Comparative Jurisprudence”(1988) 47 ICLQ 306; J Chan, “Basic 
Law and Constitutional Review: The First Decade”(2007) 37 HKLJ 407; J Chan & 
C L Lim, “Interpreting Constitutional Rights and Permissible Restrictions”, in J 
Chan & C L Lim (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd 
ed, 2015), Ch 17. 
14 HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442. 
15 Leung TC William Roy v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211. 
16 (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229, para 22.  See also Ubamaka v Secretary for Security 
[2011] 1 HKLRD 359, para 359 (CA); Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare 
(2013) 16 HKCFAR 950, at paras 177-178. 
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II. Preserving the Integrity of the Common Law System 
 
Whenever constitutional powers are divided between two different 
jurisdictions, a classic problem is where and how to draw the dividing line.   As 
an autonomous region, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy except in 
the areas of foreign affairs and defence and matters concerning the relations of 
the Central Authorities and the HKSAR.  This general principle itself is subject to 
expressed modifications in the Basic Law.  Thus, Hong Kong enjoys, upon 
authorization, considerable degree of autonomy in participating in international 
events, maintaining and developing with foreign states and regions and 
international organizations,17 and even concluding international and regional 
treaties in specific fields - no doubt a reflection of the expansive international 
networks of Hong Kong as an international financial centre.  At the same time, 
Hong Kong courts have no jurisdiction over acts of state and are bound by 
executive certificate on questions of facts concerning acts of state whenever such 
questions arise in the adjudication of cases.18  However, apart from such general 
principles, it is for the courts and the Central Authorities to work out on a case by 
case basis how the demarcation of jurisdictions is to be drawn.  Not surprisingly, 
disagreement and conflicts could arise, and the Basic Law itself provides little 
guidance on how to address these disputes. 
 
A unique feature of the Basic Law is that the power of final interpretation 
of the Basic Law is vested, not in the Court of Final Appeal, but in the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC”).  This stems from the 
fact that the HKSAR is not an independent entity but an autonomous region of 
the PRC.  Under Article 158, in adjudicating a case, the Court of Final Appeal has 
a duty to refer, before rendering final judgment, a question of interpretation of 
the Basic Law to the NPCSC if the provision in question falls within the area of 
defence, foreign affairs and the relationship between the Central Authorities and 
the HKSAR and when the interpretation will decisively affect the judgments on 
the cases. As the Court of Final Appeal explained, this Article embodies two tests: 
the classification test, which means the provision in question has to be an 
excluded provision, and the necessity test, which means that the interpretation 
of the provision in question is necessary for the final disposal of the case before 
the court. 
 
In Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration, the issue was whether the 
requirement of a certificate of entitlement, which could not be granted without 
an exit approval from the Mainland Security Bureau, for claiming a right of abode 
in Hong Kong was constitutional when there was no such requirement in the 
definition of the right of abode in Article 24 of the Basic Law.  The Government 
relied on Article 22, which provides that any person from the Mainland to come 
to Hong Kong shall obtain the approval of the Central Government, to justify the 
certificate of entitlement system.   Before the Court of Final Appeal, on the 
question of referral pursuant to Article 158, the court held that it was for the 
                                                        
17 Art 151.  The specific fields include economic, trade, financial and monetary, 
shipping, communications, tourism, cultural and sports fields.  
18 Art 19.  Examples of acts of state include defence and foreign affairs. 
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court to decide whether the classification test and the necessity test were 
satisfied.   For the purpose of argument, it was accepted that Article 22 was an 
excluded provision, and that Article 22 was arguably relevant to the 
interpretation of Art 24.   The Government argued that in such case the court was 
obliged to refer the question of interpretation to the NPCSC.  The court 
disagreed, holding that the proper test was, as a matter of substance, which was 
the predominant provision to be interpreted.  This, it found, was Article 24, 
which concerned only domestic affairs.  Article 22, which concerns central-local 
relationship, was relevant only in the background.  Li CJ held: 
 
“In our view, the test in considering whether the classification condition is 
satisfied is… As a matter of substance, what predominantly is the 
provision that has to be interpreted in the adjudication of the case?  If the 
answer is an excluded provision, the Court is obliged to refer.  If the 
answer is a provision which is not an excluded provision, then no 
reference has to be made, although an excluded provision is arguably 
relevant to the construction of the non-excluded provision even to the 
extent of qualifying it.” 
 
As the classification test was not satisfied, the Court held that there was no need 
to further consider the necessity test. 
 
Where does this predominant provision test come from?  It is by no 
means obvious from a plain reading of the text of the Basic Law.  Professor Albert 
Chen forcefully criticized the approach of the court for being illogical.19  He 
argued that (1) the court should first consider which provisions are necessary to 
be interpreted; (2) once the provisions have been identified, whether those 
provisions are excluded provisions.  There was no basis for the application of a 
predominant provision test in applying the classification test. 
 
While it is agreed that the court should first identify the provisions that 
are necessary to be interpreted before determining whether the relevant 
provisions are excluded provisions, this does not avoid the need to apply some 
kind of predominant provision test, albeit in the context of the necessity test.  
Indeed, Professor Chen himself admitted that in deciding which provisions need 
to be interpreted, the necessity test is only satisfied by those provisions which 
would be conclusive or substantially determinative of the outcome of the case 
before the court.  It is unnecessary for the CFA to refer a question to the NPCSC 
for interpretation if the provisions that have to be interpreted are only 
marginally relevant.  This is obviously desirable for protecting the integrity of 
the legal system in Hong Kong, for it is not difficult to imagine that a number of 
provisions in the Basic Law could be invoked in any Basic Law litigation.  If the 
Court of Final Appeal has to make a reference whenever an excluded provision is 
                                                        
19 Albert Chen, “The Court of Final Appeal’s Ruling in the ‘Illegal Migrant’ 
Children Case: A Critical Commentary on the Application of Article 158 of the 
Basic Law”, in Johannes Chan, H L Fu and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s 
Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Hong Kong University Press, 
2000), pp 73-141. 
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invoked and arguably relevant to the final decision of the case, this would be a 
substantial derogation from the autonomy of the HKSAR.  Professor Chen argued 
that this would not be the case, as the NPCSC was only asked to interpret the 
meaning of the excluded provision, and it was for the court to adjudicate on 
other provisions and to apply the interpretation to the case.  This explanation is 
formal rather than practical, for if the excluded provision is crucial to the 
disposition of the case, once an interpretation is made, there is little room left for 
the Court to decide.  In the Ng Ka Ling case, once the NPCSC decided that “people 
from other parts of China” in Article 22 of the Basic Law included “Mainland 
residents who have acquired the status of HK Permanent Residents by virtue of 
Article 24 upon the commencement of the Basic Law and who would like to come 
to Hong Kong to take up their right of abode”, it follows that the applicants in the 
case would need an exit approval and therefore a scheme which requires an exit 
approval would be constitutional.20   
 
Therefore, whenever a few provisions of the Basic Law are invoked in a 
case before the Court of Final Appeal, the Court would have to decide which 
provisions are “necessary” to be interpreted in the sense that their 
interpretation would be determinative of the outcome of the case.  This is not 
always a straight forward exercise.  As the Court pointed out, one provision may 
qualify another provision by way of addition, subtraction or modification, or it 
may lend colour to the meaning or provide a pointer to the interpretation of 
another provision.  Save in the most straight forward cases, the reference to the 
NPCSC may not be just the meaning of the excluded provision, for the 
interpretation has to be made in context, the context being its relations with the 
other provisions which are not excluded provisions.   Hence, a referral most 
likely means that the NPCSC would effectively determine the outcome of the 
case, and may even affect other applicable legal principle.21  As a result, the 
threshold for referral has to be high so that the necessity test is satisfied only 
when the interpretation of the provisions are determinative of the outcome of 
the case.  If a few provisions are involved, the court will have to decide which 
provisions the interpretation of which would be determinative and which 
provisions the interpretation of which would only be relevant but not 
determinative.  The power to make this decision, if the Hong Kong legal system is 
to retain its autonomy and to avoid any abuse of the referral procedure, must 
rest with the Hong Kong courts.  The rule of law depends on that.  Whether it is 
called a predominant provision test or a conclusive effect test, the mischief to be 
avoided is the same, namely to safeguard the integrity of the common law system 
in Hong Kong. It must also be borne in mind that the interpretation by the NPCSC 
is essentially a political process without any transparency.  Its interpretation is 
not constrained by legal consideration or the rule of evidence.  It is only right for 
a court at the highest level to act cautiously in giving up its jurisdiction in the 
process of its adjudication to a political body to effectively determine the 
                                                        
20 See Albert Chen, supra, at p 133.  The same is true in the Congo case, see below. 
21 For instance, in Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates 
LLC (No 1) (2011) 14 HKCFAR 95, the effect of the NPCSC interpretation is that 
the common law rule on relative immunity is found to be inconsistent with the 
Basic Law and hence does not form part of the law of the HKSAR. 
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outcome of the case.  What underlies the reasoning of the court is a higher 
principle that the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts must be vigilantly 
safeguarded in order to maintain the integrity of the legal system. 
 
Although the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Ka Ling held that it was not 
necessary to refer any question to the NPCSC for interpretation, the HKSAR 
Government sought such an interpretation on the basis that the judgment of the 
Court caused considerable difficulties for Hong Kong, as a large number of 
Mainland born children would as a result acquire a right of abode in Hong Kong.  
In June 199, the NPCSC issued an interpretation that effectively reversed the 
judgment of the Court.22   
 
The NPCSC interpretation has cast considerable doubt over the 
independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the Hong Kong legal system.  
The interpretation is primarily a political decision that was made without any 
transparency.  There were concerns whether the judiciary could remain 
independent if its final judgments could be reversed by a political organ across 
the border, and how independence of the judiciary could reconcile with the 
NPCSC interpretation, which is constitutional within the Mainland legal system.  
This question was addressed in Chong Fung Yuen v Director of Immigration.23  
The issue in that case was whether a child born in Hong Kong to parents neither 
of whom was a Hong Kong Permanent Resident would acquire a right of abode in 
Hong Kong.  In no uncertain term the Court of Final Appeal dispelled any concern 
that a judge would have to look over his shoulder to take into account possible 
responses from the NPCSC in discharging his judicial duty.  It held that the courts 
in Hong Kong are bound to apply the common law, and not the principles in the 
Mainland system, in interpreting the Basic Law.  Under the common law, the 
courts’ role is “to construe the legislative intent of the Basic Law as expressed in 
the language. Their task is not to ascertain the intent of the lawmaker on its own.  
Their duty is to ascertain what was meant by the language used and to give effect 
to the legislative intent as expressed in the language.”24  The language was not 
looked at in isolation but in light of its context or purpose, and the courts must 
avoid a literal, technical, narrow or rigid approach.  At the same time, the courts 
could not give the language a meaning which it could not bear.  In interpreting 
the Basic Law, while the courts may resort to extrinsic materials, such as the 
Joint Declaration and the Explanations on the draft Basic Law before its 
enactment, that throw light on the context or purpose of the Basic Law, the 
courts have to be cautious and should adopt a particularly prudent approach in 
considering post-enactment materials.25  This point is of particular significance 
as the NPCSC in its interpretation reversing Ng Ka Ling stated that the intent of 
the Basic Law could be found in a report of the Preparatory Committee, which 
was set up six years after the enactment of the Basic Law for the purpose of 
                                                        
22 For a detailed discussion, see Johannes Chan & C L Lim, Law of the Hong Kong 
Constitution, supra, paras 2.080-2.093; Johannes Chan, H L Fu and Yash Ghai 
(eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation, supra. 
23 (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211. 
24 Ibid, at 223. 
25 Ibid, at 224-225. 
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preparing for the establishment of the HKSAR.  The Court in Chong Fung Yuen 
held that this report could not affect the interpretation of a provision when the 
meaning of its language is clear, alongside an expression of doubts of the 
relevance and the appropriateness of considering such extrinsic pre-enactment 
materials in any event.   
 
With regard to the NPCSC interpretation, the Court respected the power 
of the NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law under Art 67(4) of the PRC Constitution 
and Art 158 of the Basic Law, but held that this power operated in a different 
system and was legislative, and not judicial, in nature.  Once an interpretation 
has been made, it is binding on the Hong Kong courts and forms part of the 
system in the HKSAR.  Yet before an interpretation has been made, the courts 
need only refer to the common law in interpreting the Basic Law.  Even after an 
interpretation has been made, the courts will still have to ascertain the scope of 
the interpretation.  Accordingly, the Court found that some remarks on the 
nature of Art 24 in the previous NPCSC interpretation was confined to the 
context of that interpretation and was not binding on the Court in interpreting a 
different subsection of the same provision in a different context.  Having held 
that the provision before the Court was not an excluded provision, the Court 
rejected the Director’s application for making a judicial reference to the NPCSC.26 
 
Chong Fung Yuen is important, not only in restoring public confidence in 
the independence of the judiciary after the first NPCSC interpretation, but also in 
the Court’s innovative approach of characterizing the NPCSC interpretation, 
which operates in a different system, as legislative in nature and therefore 
providing a theoretical justification for the Hong Kong judiciary to legitimately 
exclude any consideration of possible responses from the legislative organ of a 
different legal system in interpreting the Basic law.  It is clear that the protecting 
the integrity of the common law system is a crucial constitutional principle, if not 
the raison ete, of the judgment.  The point was made even more explicit in the 
subsequent case of Vallejos v Commission of Registration,27 where the Court of 
Final Appeal refused to make a judicial reference for the NPCSC on the ground 
that the necessity test for referral was not satisfied.  The Court emphasized that 
the question for interpretation had to be arguable.  An argument that is plainly 
and obviously bad would not be arguable.  The Chief Justice pointed out that “the 
arguability factor is implicit in Art 158(3) to ensure integrity in the operation of 
a reference.  Otherwise, there will be a risk of potential abuse; all sorts of fanciful 
arguments could then be made just to seek a reference to the Standing 
Committee.”28  The Court has to be cautious in making any judicial reference, not 
only because it is charged with the responsibility of making final adjudication of 
cases on its own, but also because there is the “long established rule that a 
common law court cannot abdicate any part of its judicial function to any other 
body.”29  
 
                                                        
26 Ibid, at p 229. 
27 (2013) 16 HKCFAR 45, at paras 103-112.  
28 Ibid, para 104. 
29 Ibid, para 106. 
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The same invisible principle can be discerned in the Congo case,30 
although this is a more difficult case to fit into the pattern.  In that case, the 
plaintiff sought to enforce an arbitral award against the Government of Congo 
Republic in Hong Kong against certain payment that was due by a PRC state 
owned enterprise to the Congo Government under a separate mining agreement.  
The Congo Government resisted the proceeding by raising sovereign immunity 
in Hong Kong courts.  The common law position is that sovereignty immunity is 
not applicable if the foreign government is engaged in a transaction of a 
commercial nature (“the restrictive immunity principle”), whereas the foreign 
policy of China is to accord a foreign state an absolute immunity in her domestic 
courts.  Does the issue involve an application of the common law principle, or 
does it involve “an act of state such as foreign affairs” within the meaning of 
Articles 13 and 19 of the Basic Law so that it falls outside the jurisdiction of the 
Hong Kong courts? The Court of Appeal held that state immunity was a matter of 
common law.  The Court of Final Appeal by a 3 to 2 majority reversed this 
decision.  The majority held that in a unitary state, the practice or the doctrine of 
state immunity applied uniformly across the state, and that the executive and the 
court had to speak with one voice on the policy of state immunity.  Under the 
Basic Law, the responsibility for foreign affairs was a matter exclusively for the 
Central Government.  The doctrine of state immunity was concerned with 
relations between states and hence fell within the scope of foreign affairs, over 
which the Hong Kong courts had no jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court of Final 
Appeal decided, for the first time, to refer to the NPCSC a number of questions for 
its interpretation.  Further, the common law on state immunity was overridden 
by the Basic Law to the extent of inconsistency with the PRC foreign policy. 
 
The minority disagreed, holding that the issue before the court was a 
matter of common law and should be decided by the Hong Kong court.  They 
drew a distinction between recognition of a foreign state, which was a matter for 
the executive on which one voice was desirable if not essential, and the extent of 
immunity available in courts, which was a matter of law to be determined by the 
judiciary.  Therefore, whether the immunity was absolute or restrictive, it was a 
matter of law for the courts. The determination of this question did not involve 
any exercise of jurisdiction over acts of state, defence or foreign affairs; nor did it 
involve the interpretation of any provision of the Basic Law. 
 
In considering the arguments, the Court of Final Appeal was heavily 
influenced by three letters that were placed by the Office of the Commissioner of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“OCMFA”) before the courts at various stages.  
The 1st letter, which was placed before the Court of First Instance, addressed 
solely the position of the PRC on state immunity.  The 2nd letter, which was 
placed before the Court of Appeal, explained the unchanged position of the PRC 
despite her ratification of the UN Convention on Restrictive Immunity, which has 
not come into effect.  The Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence to 
show that a restrictive immunity doctrine would jeopardize or prejudice any 
state interest.  So, a 3rd letter was placed before the Court of Final Appeal which 
                                                        
30 Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (No 1)(2011) 
14 HKCFAR 95. 
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identified the prejudice to the sovereignty of the Chinese state had the doctrine 
of restrictive immunity been adopted in Hong Kong.  Unlike the two previous 
letters, the 3rd letter was drafted in strong language and tone.31  This has 
prompted Bokhary PJ to extract a concession from the Secretary for Justice that 
the letter was to draw the court’s attention to the policy of the PRC and not to 
dictate a result.32  The tone of this letter was clear that were the court to adopt 
the doctrine of restrictive immunity, such decision would likely be reversed by 
an interpretation of the NPCSC.33 
 
The precise status of these three letters was unclear.  Under Art 19 of the 
Basic Law, it is possible for the Chief Executive to certify certain questions of fact 
concerning acts of state whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of 
cases.  Such certificate shall be binding on the courts and be treated as conclusive 
proof of the facts stated therein.  No such certificate has been issued in this case.  
Indeed, the Court itself held that it was unnecessary to do so, as these letters 
would constitute such certification.  This is hardly satisfactory.  The fact of state, 
as it is known, is a procedure to introduce statements of fact which shall be 
treated as conclusive proof by the court.  The purpose is to ensure a proper way 
of introducing conclusive evidence into the court and a certain formality is 
required.  If a letter from OCMFA can constitute such conclusive proof, does it 
suggest in future any letter from any government department of the Central 
Authority could constitute such conclusive proof?  It may be a formality in this 
case, as it is hardly thinkable that the Chief Executive will not provide a 
certificate to this effect if requested.  Yet the formality is there to avoid any 
undue pressure to be exerted on the court directly by any department of the 
Central Government. 
 
Thus, in light of the clear position of the Central Government, the Court 
was faced with only limited options.  First, it may decide to refer the question of 
interpretation to the NCPSC, as it has chosen to do, and the outcome is certain 
that there would be absolute immunity and the common law of restrictive 
immunity would be reversed.  Secondly, it may decide to go along with the 
minority to decide the case on the common law principle of restrictive immunity 
and not to refer the question to the NPCSC.  Its decision would then most likely 
be reversed by a subsequent NPCSC interpretation.  This would be the exact 
replication of the Ng Ka Ling situation and may have a detrimental effect on the 
                                                        
31 The letter was reproduced in para 211 of the Judgment. 
32 See para 91 of the Judgment.  See also para 294 where the majority expressed 
the same view. 
33 See Eric Cheung, supra.  Benny Tai argued that as a result, the Court made a 
calculated decision to make a reference in order to minimise the damage that 
could have been done to judicial independence by a subsequent adverse 
interpretation from the NPCSC, given that the context of this case was not 
political and the issue of foreign affairs was obviously arguable: see Benny Tai, 
“The Constitutional Game of Art 158(3) of the Basic Law” (2011) 41 HKLJ 377. 
This is an interesting observation but it does not explain why the court could not 
just go through the common law route without seeking an interpretation and 
decide that the common law of restrictive immunity has to be modified. 
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Hong Kong legal system.  There would also be uncertainty on how far the scope 
of the NPCSC interpretation would be in such circumstances, especially when the 
NPCSC interpretation could not affect judgment previously rendered and then 
the Congo Government would come within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong 
court despite the NPCSC interpretation.  Thirdly, the Court may avoid the issue of 
sovereign immunity by holding that whatever be the position on sovereign 
immunity, the Congo Government had waived its immunity by defending these 
proceedings.34  While this is a perfectly defensible position and may be a less 
controversial route, it may not be an attractive solution as the Central 
Government is keen not to exercise any jurisdiction over the Congo Government.  
The consequence of this option would still likely be a reversal of the Court’s 
decision by a subsequent NPCSC interpretation. 
 
There was apparently a fourth option.  The majority of the Court of Final 
Appeal accepted that restrictive immunity represented the common law before 
the changeover.35  Under Article 8 and 160, the common law is preserved save to 
the extent that it is inconsistent with the Basic Law, and may be subject to such 
modifications, adaptations, limitations or exceptions as are necessary so as to 
bring them in conformity with the status of Hong Kong after the change of 
sovereignty.36  Instead of deciding that the doctrine of state immunity is an act of 
state and therefore falls outside the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts, the 
majority could have decided, as did the minority, that the extent of state 
immunity is a matter of common law, which has to be modified to reflect the 
status of Hong Kong as part of a unified state that adopts the policy of absolute 
immunity.  In this way, the court could have reached a position that the common 
law principle in Hong Kong after 1997 is no longer restrictive immunity but 
absolute immunity, and therefore it would be unnecessary to refer any question 
of interpretation to the NPCSC.37 On this basis, it would decline jurisdiction over 
                                                        
34 The dominant position in international law is that mere agreement to 
arbitration does not mean that there is also waiver to the enforcement of the 
arbitral award.  This position is hardly defensive as a matter of fairness. 
35 At para 221 of the Judgment. 
36 Decision of the NPCSC on the Treatment of the Laws Previously in Force in 
Hong Kong in accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law, referred to at para 
313 of the Judgment. 
37 See Yap Po Jen, “Why Absolute Immunity Should Apply but a Reference was 
Unnecessary?”(2011) 41 HKLJ 391.  Yap argued that the one voice policy cases 
could be distinguished because the executive in Britain had not spoken with 
another voice, whereas the Secretary for Justice in Hong Kong has spoken with a 
different voice.  It is true that the executive in Britain had not expressed a 
different view and therefore left the matter of determining the extent of 
immunity to the court, it does not follow that if the executive has spoken the one 
voice policy has to be adopted.  To make this argument one would have to accept 
that the determination of state policy on immunity is a matter outside the 
jurisdiction of the court, an argument which Yap has expressed doubt.  As 
Cheung pointed out, China has entered into over 100 bilateral agreements that 
have adopted the position of restrictive immunity and it would be absurd to 
suggest that there was one voice: see Eric Cheung, “Undermining Our Judicial 
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the Congo Government and this option would serve both the interest of China 
and the interest of protecting the integrity of the common law system. 
 
Instead, the majority chose to refer to the NPCSC a question of 
interpretation of Art 13 and 19 of the Basic Law.  Arguably Article 13, which 
provides that the Central Government shall be responsible for foreign affairs, is 
never an issue.  There is no dispute of this fact.  The question is, notwithstanding 
this, whether the doctrine of state immunity is nonetheless a matter of common 
law that could be decided by the Hong Kong courts.  Article 19, which provides 
that the court has no jurisdiction over acts of state such as foreign affairs, comes 
closer, and the effect of the NPCSC interpretation is that the court would have to 
forgo jurisdiction in future whenever state immunity is raised.38  This is so even 
when state immunity is raised by a state that has subscribed to the principle of 
restrictive immunity.   The position would have been the same if the Court 
decided that the common law is now one of absolute immunity.   This retrograde 
position seems like an awkward option for the court to adopt.  It would be even 
more awkward when the UN Convention on Restrictive Immunity, to which 
China has ratified, comes into effect.  Would the common law have to be changed 
again? Thus, instead of surrendering itself to such a dire position, the majority 
may consider that this position is best assigned to the One Country component 
and therefore leaving the Two Systems component out of it.  This is an ironic 
position to take.  Admittedly the Court has to balance between respecting the 
PRC sovereignty and limiting the harm to the common law system.  In choosing 
to make a judicial referral, the courts may protect the purity of the common law 
but may also have inadvertently given up jurisdiction in relation to what 
constitutes foreign affairs in future.  It is not, for the purpose of this paper, to say 
that judicial referral is a desirable approach, indeed much to be said to the 
contrary as expressed in the powerful minority judgments, but rather to explain 
that the majority of the Court may probably consider it to be the least 
detrimental position to adopt in the circumstances and hence the decision could 
still be explained, perhaps equally ironically, by the higher principle of keeping 
the integrity of the common law system! 
 
In deciding to make a reference to the NPCSC, the Court of Final Appeal 
laid down certain parameters.  First, it declined to decide the question of referral 
as a preliminary issue.  Instead, it insisted on hearing full arguments on the 
merits of the case on the ground that whether certain provisions are necessary 
and determinative of the outcome of the case could only be fully appreciated 
when the court was appraised of the merits of the case.  Secondly, the court, after 
hearing the parties, formulated the questions that it required the NPCSC to 
interpret.  This will define the scope of the interpretation.  Although such 
questions are technically not binding on the NPCSC, the NPCSC did give its 
                                                                                                                                                              
Independence and Autonomy” (2011) 41 HKLJ 411.  The court accepted that it 
has to take into account the state policy in determining the content of the 
common law principle of state immunity.  Thus, it is open to the court to take 
into account the absolute immunity principle of the PRC and modify the common 
law in Hong Kong accordingly.   
38 See P Y Lo, “The Gateway Opens Wide” (2011) 41 HKLJ 385. 
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interpretation within the framework of these questions.  Thirdly, the court itself 
also rendered a provisional judgment on the issue.  It is provisional as it is 
subject to the interpretation of the NPCSC.  The provisional judgment was placed 
before the NPCSC so that the NPCSC has the benefit of the views of the highest 
court before it renders its interpretation.  This is important in another aspect.  
The parties to the litigation do not have any right to appear before the NPCSC, 
yet its interpretation is determinative of the outcome of the case.  By allowing 
the parties to make full submissions on the merits and by giving a provisional 
judgment, the Court has at least afforded the parties a full and fair hearing, even 
though its decision is not final.  Given that there is no right of audience before the 
NPCSC, this procedure affords the best the Hong Kong legal system could provide 
to ensure a fair hearing. 
 
None of these procedures are set out in the Basic Law.  The purpose of 
drawing up these procedures is obviously an attempt to minimize the 
arbitrariness of the NPCSC interpretation and in turn, to protect the integrity of 
the legal system in Hong Kong.   The invisible constitutional principle is at work 
again. 
 
 
III. Continuity of the Previous System v A Living Tree Principle 
 
A constitution should serve its community, and the community changes with 
time.  Thus, the constitution should be able to evolve to respond to social 
changes. It should be a living tree that is capable of growth and development, 
and should not be stunt by historical relics.  As Justice Bertha Wilson nicely put 
it, “a constitution is always unfinished and is always evolving… [It is like a] chain 
novel where generations of judges produce their respective chapters.  Each judge 
is constrained to a degree by what has gone on before, but at the same time is 
obliged to make the novel the best that it can be.”39 
 
At the same time, the Basic Law expressly provides that the previous 
capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.40  The 
preservation of the previous social, economic and legal system was of great 
importance in maintaining the confidence of the people in Hong Kong in the 
future at a time of great uncertainty when the Joint Declaration was signed in 
1984, and continues to be of importance as Hong Kong is moving towards the 
end of the guaranteed period of 50 years, which will expire in 2047.  This theme 
of continuity with the previous system, which does not always sit well with the 
                                                        
39 B Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution: Approaches to Judicial 
Interpretation” [1988] PL 370 at 372.  The famous chain novel analogy comes 
from Professor Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap, 1986). 
40 Art 5.  This article does not mean that the system has to be changed after 50 
years. The position in 2047, when the guaranteed period of 50 years expires, is 
unclear at this stage.  For other provisions that refer to the preservation of the 
previous system, see, for example, 103 (public servants), 136 (education 
system), 142 (professional qualifications), 144 (subvention for non-
governmental organizations), and 145 (social welfare system). 
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living tree characteristics of the Basic Law, has come up in a number of cases, 
and has on some occasions produced awkward consequences. 
 
In Association of Expatriate Civil Servants of Hong Kong v Chief Executive of 
the HKSAR,41 the applicants argued that the procedures for the appointment and 
dismissal of public servants must be established either by legislation or with 
legislative approval, as Art 48(7) of the Basic Law requires the Chief Executive to 
appoint or remove holders of public office “in accordance with legal procedure”, 
whereas the Public Service (Administrative) Order 1997 and the Public Service 
(Disciplinary) Regulation were executive orders only.  The Government relied on 
Art 103 of the Basic Law, which provides that “Hong Kong’s previous system of 
recruitment [and] … discipline… for the public services … shall be maintained.”  
Keith J held that since the previous procedures for the recruitment and dismissal 
of holders of public officers were established by the Crown under the Hong Kong 
Letters Patent and the Colonial Regulations in the exercise of its prerogative, and 
by the Governor in the exercise of powers expressly conferred upon him by the 
Colonial Regulations, the maintenance of the previous system did not require the 
current system to have the approval of the Legislature.  Insofar as the phrase “in 
accordance with legal procedure” in Art 48(7) was concerned, this phrase has to 
be construed together with Art 103 and simply means a procedure established 
lawfully rather than a procedure to be established by law.  Since the procedures 
laid down by the Chief Executive in the Order and the Regulation maintained 
Hong Kong’s previous system of recruitment and discipline of the public service 
and were lawfully established, they satisfied the requirement of “in accordance 
with legal procedure”.  Although this phrase appears a few times in the Basic 
Law, Keith J held that “the meaning of a particular provision, whether in an 
ordinance or in a constitutional instrument such as the Basic Law, depends very 
much on its context”, and the learned judge did not discern a clear pattern as to 
the rationale behind the use of one phrase and not another in the Basic Law.   
 
Keith J’s decision was distinguished by Hartmann J (as he then was) in 
Leung Kwok Hung v Chief Executive of the HKSAR.42  In that case, the issue was 
whether an executive order setting out the procedure for applications for the 
approval of interceptions of telecommunications complied with the requirement 
of “in accordance with legal procedure” in Art 30 of the Basic Law.  Hartmann J 
emphasized that the context in which this phrase was to be interpreted was very 
different from that in Art 48(7), as Art 30 was concerned with the protection of a 
fundamental right of privacy.  Such context required a different interpretation.  
Hartmann J held: 
 
 “149. In my view, it is a formalistic outcome to say that the fundamental 
right contained in art.30, which the article requires shall be protected by 
law, may nevertheless be restricted by a body of purely administrative 
                                                        
41 [1998] 1 HKLRD 615. 
42 HCAL 107/2005, upheld on appeal: CACV 73 and 87/2006.  In the further 
appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, the issue of the legality of the executive order 
was no longer pursued: (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441 (sub nom Koo Sze Yiu v Chief 
Executive of the HKSAR). 
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procedures which are not law and which bind only public servants who, 
in the event of abuse, are subject only to internal disciplinary 
proceedings.  That, in my view, would derogate substantially from the 
practical and effective value of the right guaranteed by the article.  That, I 
am satisfied - giving the article a generous interpretation in order to 
protect the full measure of the value of the right it guarantees - cannot 
have been the intention of those who drafted the Basic Law.   
 
 150. I am satisfied, therefore, that the use of the phrase ‘in accordance 
with legal procedures’ in art 30 means procedures which are laid down by 
law in the sense that they form part of substantive law, invariably in order 
to comply with the requirements of legal certainty, within legislation, 
primary and/or secondary.” 
 
The distinction is not satisfactory.  It is difficult to see why invasion of 
privacy has to be provided by law whereas disciplinary action that could have 
resulted in the removal of a public servant from employment and a substantial 
loss of pension benefit could be prescribed by administrative procedures.  Loss 
of livelihood would have been the concern of a far higher number of ordinary 
people than occasional covert surveillance carried out by law enforcement 
agents.  A plausible explanation is that the disciplinary system is a continuation 
of the previous system, and it is such an overriding principle that the court 
would be hesitant to upset the system by demanding legislative intervention. 
 
This argument was reinforced in Kong Yunming v Director of Social 
Welfare.43  At issue was whether a substantial change of the residence 
requirement from 1 year to 7 years for Comprehensive Social Welfare Assistance 
(CSSA) was a violation of the Applicant’s pre-existing right to social welfare 
under Art 36 of the Basic Law.   The CSSA scheme is a non-contributory, means-
tested social security scheme that is aimed at providing a safety net for people 
who are unable to meet their basic needs.  Like all forms of social security in 
Hong Kong, the CSSA scheme has all along been a non-statutory scheme and is 
administered by the Social Welfare Department. The Department has issued 
guidelines which set out the criteria, the procedure for application and even a 
system of administrative appeal against refusal to provide CSSA. It is not in 
dispute that these guidelines are administrative in nature and are generally 
accessible. One of the issues is whether a restriction on the right to social welfare 
that was imposed administratively satisfied the requirement of Art 36, which 
provides that “Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare in 
accordance with law.”   
 
Both the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal were concerned of 
the implications of a requirement of restrictions by law on the social welfare 
system. At the Court of Appeal, Stock VP noted that Art 36 did not set out any 
type of social welfare or any level of benefits that a person might enjoy. Nor did it 
provide for any restriction of the right or the type of restriction that could be 
imposed.  The learned judge then argued that any social welfare must carry with 
                                                        
43 (2013) 16 HKCFAR 950. 
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it eligibility conditions.  These eligibility conditions should not be regarded as 
restrictions, and accordingly, the question of restrictions in accordance with law 
did not arise.44  Alternatively, the Court relied on Art 145, which provides that 
“[o]n the basis of the previous social welfare system, the Government of the 
HKSAR shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development and 
improvement of this system in the light of the economic conditions and social 
needs.”  It was held that Art 145 itself provided the legal basis; that “the 
qualifying conditions may justifiably be described as prescribed by law in that 
they are authorized by article 145 itself, are accessible, establish rules of general 
application and do not permit arbitrary or random decision-making.”45 On the 
first ground, the distinction between eligibility condition and restriction is a 
semantic distinction without any difference in substance.  In any event, the UN 
Human Rights Committee has commented that “any qualifying conditions for 
benefits must be reasonable, proportionate and transparent.  The withdrawal, 
reduction or suspension of benefits should be circumscribed, based on grounds 
that are reasonable, subject to due process, and provided for in national law.”46 
Thus, the restriction will still have to satisfy the proportionality test whether it is 
described as a restriction or an eligibility condition. On the second ground, if Art 
145 provides the legal basis, the requirement of “in accordance with law” is 
tautological and practically meaningless.   
 
Surprisingly, this reasoning was endorsed by the Court of Final Appeal, 
which resorted to the “previous system”.  Ribeiro PJ held:47 
 
 “Article 145 recognizes and endorses the validity of “the previous social 
welfare system” which consisted of a non-statutory system of 
administrative rules and policies.  Accordingly, reading art 36 together 
with art 145, the intention of the Basic Law must be taken to be that such 
administrative system – consisting of rules that are accessible, 
systematically applied and subject to a process of administrative appeal – 
is to be treated as a system providing “social welfare in accordance with 
law” within the meaning of art 36.” 
 
This reasoning is hardly convincing.  Article 145 provides a framework to 
enable the Government to formulate social welfare policies in accordance with 
the changing economic conditions.  It is at least not clear that Article 145 also 
endorses an administrative scheme, which would have made a mockery of the 
requirement of “in accordance with law” in Art 36.  Though the Court of Final 
Appeal did not agree with the Court of Appeal that Article 36 did not provide any 
substance other than a right not to be discriminated in the enjoyment of social 
                                                        
44 CACC 185/2009 (CA, 17 Feb 2012), paras 53, 73-74. 
45 Ibid, para 74.   
46 General Comment No 19, para 24. 
47 (2013) 16 HKCFAR 950, para 25, though the Court of Final Appeal did not 
accept the first reason on a distinction between eligibility condition and 
restriction.  For a commentary, see Simon Young, “Does it matter if restrictions 
on the right to social welfare in Hong Kong are prescribed by law or policy?” 
(2014) 44 HKLJ 25. 
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welfare rights, the Court of Final Appeal did share the concern that social welfare 
system had to cater for a wide range of clients in a wide range of different 
circumstances and therefore it was better served by a flexible, transparent and 
predictable administrative system rather than by having each benefit spelt out 
through a legislative process.48  Yet the desirability for flexibility in 
administering a social welfare system is not unique to Hong Kong, and many 
other jurisdictions have found no impediment to introduce a statute on social 
welfare.49  The facts that the administrative rules are accessible, systematically 
applied and include an administrative appeal system to reduce arbitrariness in 
the decision-making process do not by themselves turn an administrative 
scheme into law.  The requirement of “in accordance with law” is not formalistic.  
It serves an important democratic value that any restriction of a fundamental 
right has to be properly debated and scrutinized by the people’s representatives 
in the Legislature.50 To regard an administrative scheme as “law” will defeat the 
important function of legislative scrutiny and is inconsistent with the approach 
of the court in adopting a wide margin of appreciation.  In justifying a wide 
margin of appreciation, the Court relied heavily on legislative scrutiny because 
social and economic policies were better judged by the legislature than by the 
court.51  Yet by accepting an administrative scheme as “law”, the court leaves no 
room for legislative scrutiny!  It appears that the rather loose requirement on 
legislative sanction could only be explained partly by the judicial perception of 
the nature of social and economic rights, an issue that we will come back later, 
and partly by the eagerness to uphold an invisible principle of continuation of 
the previous system.  The Court was reluctant to upset the previous 
administrative social welfare scheme that has been in place for many years by 
imposing a requirement of legal framework. 
 
Another significant implication of the continuity principle in this case is 
the determination of the scope of the right to social welfare.  The Court of Appeal 
has great difficulty in defining the scope of the right under Art 36, which 
eventually led to its rejection of any substantive right under Art 36 save for a 
right not to be discriminated in the enjoyment of the right to social welfare.  The 
Court of Final Appeal accepted that the right that received constitutional 
protection under Art 36 would be the rights as defined by the rules of eligibility 
                                                        
48 At para 27. 
49 For example, see the UK Social Security Act, the Australian Social Security Act,  
50 See “The Word ‘Law’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights”, Advisory Opinion, OC-6/08, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Series A, No 6 (9 May 1986), paras 21-22. 
51 See, for example, the judgment of Cheung CJHC at the Court of First Instance, 
para 56.  See also the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Fok Chun-wa v 
Hospital Authority (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409 at para 63-64, where the Court held, 
in the context of justifying the concept of a wide margin of appreciation, that 
“where matters of state or community policy are concerned, these are matters 
predominantly for the Executive or the Legislature.” 
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on the date of establishment of the HKSAR, namely 1 July 1997.52  In order to 
determine progression or retrogression under Art 145, there has to be a baseline 
for assessment.  The obvious, and perhaps the only sensible, baseline would be 
the rights as existed at the time when the HKSAR came into being.  What the 
applicant was entitled to on that date included the then eligibility condition, 
namely the 1-year residence requirement.  Nothing more, nothing less.  Thus, in 
one stroke, the Court constitutionalized the social welfare rights (and 
conditions) as existed on 1 July 1997, and any further restriction from that level 
of social welfare benefits has to be justified.53   
 
In contrast, the courts are well aware of the sensitivity of fossilizing the 
previous system, and in this regard, they have drawn a distinction based on 
whether a fundamental right was engaged.  In Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong v 
Secretary for Education,54 the issue was whether the introduction of a school-
based management scheme by the Government, which has the effect of diluting 
the control of the church in the management board of government-aided schools 
run by the Catholic Church, was in violation of the right of the religious 
organization to continue to run its schools “in accordance with the previous 
practice”, contrary to Art 141 of the Basic Law.  The Applicant argued that the 
“previous practice” embodied an exclusive control over the appointment of the 
school management committee, the supervisor and the principal of its schools.   
The argument failed, firstly on factual grounds that the previous system did 
allow the Director of Education to require binding constitution and appoint 
managers, and that the new system did leave religious organizations free to 
nominate a majority of the persons serving on the management committees of 
the aided schools that it sponsored.  It also failed on the ground that the 
“previous practice” could not prevent the Government from making changes.  Art 
141 was to preserve the continuity of the previous system, but it did not prevent 
changes to individual elements of the system.55 On the other hand, this phrase 
did protect religious organizations to run their schools in accordance with the 
previous practice insofar as it involved the exercise of their right to religious 
belief and religious activities, such as morning prayers or religious instructions, 
but constitutional protection was not engaged in relation to policies that had no 
religious content. Thus, the concept of previous practice is extended to cover 
religious rights and freedom in the education context, and yet it allows the 
education system to be further developed in light of changing social conditions. 
 
                                                        
52 See paras 34-35.  See also Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong v Secretary for Justice 
(2011) 14 HKCFAR 754, at para 45 for a similar holding that the previous 
education system refers to the system in place just before 1 July 1997. 
53 Bokhary PJ, in his separate judgment, held that if any restriction is to be 
justified by economic downturn, it has to be so dire as to bring about a situation 
not contemplated by the constitution, or otherwise Art 145 would be of little 
practical use: see para 160.  See also Albert Chen, “’A Stroke of Genius’ in Kong 
Yunming” (2014) 44 HKLJ 7. 
54 (2011) 14 HKCFAR 754.   
55 At para 61-62.  See also Secretary for Justice v Lau Kwok Fai ((2005) 8 HKCFAR 
304, at para 66. 
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The theme of continuity has also been invoked in rejecting an argument to 
outlaw some administrative tribunals such as the Market Misconduct Tribunal or 
the Inland Revenue Board on the ground that they had usurped powers which 
were reserved for the judiciary. 56 Administrative tribunals have played an 
important and valuable role in Hong Kong.  Bearing in mind the theme of 
continuity in the Basic Law, it was held that there has to be very compelling and 
sound reasons before it could be concluded that the vesting of judicial power in 
the judiciary under Art 80 of the Basic Law would have the effect of outlawing 
these tribunals and rendering their statutory jurisdiction unconstitutional for 
having ousted the jurisdiction of the judiciary or usurped the judicial functions of 
the courts.   
 
On the other hand, the same theme has also been invoked in justifying 
restrictions of constitutional rights.  It was invoked in justifying legislative action 
to reduce the pay of civil servants, as the threat of legislative intervention in 
employment contract with the Government was a feature in the pre-1997 
regime.57  Likewise, corporate voting in the functional constituency system, 
under which corporations are entitled to vote in functional constituencies to 
return a member in their constituency to the Legislative Council, was justified on 
the ground that this system, albeit some distance away from full democracy, 
represented a feature in the previous political system and has to be considered 
in its historical context.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the right to 
vote in Art 26 of Basic Law did not preclude corporate voting.58  It is not the 
purpose of this paper to argue whether the theme of continuity should only be 
used to advance constitutional entitlements, but rather to show that this 
invisible principle does play a part in constitutional interpretation. 
 
 
IV. Separation of Powers 
 
One of the perennial debates in Hong Kong is the nature of the governance 
system.  The Mainland authorities keep describing Hong Kong as an “executive-
led system”, meaning that both the Legislature and the Judiciary are to support 
and not to challenge the Executive Government, and accordingly leaves no room 
for checks and balances against excesses by the Executive Government.  This 
phrase of “executive-led government” appears nowhere in the Basic Law, but it is 
contended that the former colonial system under which the Governor enjoyed 
practically unchecked powers is to be preserved in the HKSAR.   This is partly 
because the former system is regarded as highly efficient, and partly because it is 
much easier for the Mainland authorities to maintain control on the development 
of Hong Kong through an appointed Chief Executive.  On the other hand, 
                                                        
56 Koon Wing Yee v Insider Dealing Tribunal [2013] 1 HKLRD 76, at para 59; 
(2008) 11 HKCFAR 170 (CFA); Luk Ka Cheung v Market Misconduct Tribunal 
[2009] 1 HKC 1, para 35; Lee Yee Shing Jacky v Inland Revenue Board [2011] 6 
HKC 307, para 98. 
57 Secretary for Justice v Lau Kwok Fai ((2005) 8 HKCFAR 304. 
58 Chan Yu Nam v Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, CACV 2 & 
3/2010 (7 Dec 2010). 
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preservation of the colonial system is incompatible with a number of features in 
the Basic Law.  While the Chief Executive is vested with extensive powers under 
the Basic Law, he is also subject to extensive checks and balances in the exercise 
of his powers that were hitherto not in existence in the previous colonial regime.  
For instance, while the Chief Executive may refuse to give assent to any bill if he 
considers that the bill is not compatible with the overall interests of Hong Kong 
and may return the bill to the Legislative Council for reconsideration, his option 
is limited if the Legislature returns the bill on reconsideration by no less than a 
two-third majority.  He has either to give his assent or to dissolve the Legislature, 
a power that he could exercise only once during his term.  If he decides to 
dissolve the Legislative Council and if the new Legislative Council passes the bill 
again by a two-third majority, the Chief Executive has to resign if he still refuses 
to assent to the bill.  Besides, the Legislative Council is vested with the power to 
impeach the Chief Executive for a serious breach of law or a dereliction of duty, 
which power does not exist in the previous system.  This has led many observers 
to conclude that the system under the Basic Law is one of checks and balances, 
whether it is executive-led or not.  This debate is particularly intense in the 
development of representative government in Hong Kong.59 
 
The courts have on a number of occasions expressed its view on the 
nature of the governance system, and have unambiguously come down in favour 
of a system of separation of powers.60  There are a number of implications of this 
view.  It reinforces the principle of legality so that the executive Government is 
subject to law and, a fortiori, judicial review of executive action.  It also means 
that the power of interpretation of law is vested in the judiciary.  This includes 
the Basic Law, which provides that no laws in the HKSAR shall contravene the 
Basic Law.  Accordingly, in the first case on the Basic Law, the Court of Final 
Appeal held that the power to determine whether any executive act or legislative 
provision contravenes the Basic Law and to strike down any incompatible 
legislative provision is vested in the courts.61  Thus, in one brush the Court of 
Final Appeal assumed the power of constitutional review and the power to strike 
down legislative acts that are inconsistent with the Basic Law when nowhere in 
the Basic Law expressly confers this power on the judiciary – a power which has 
been controversial in other jurisdictions.  Secondly, it influences the 
development of the doctrine of margin of appreciation in that there are distinct 
constitutional roles and areas of competence for each of the three branches of 
Government so that the courts should afford deference to the other two branches 
of Government in exercising its powers of constitutional scrutiny.  We will come 
back to this point in the next section.   
 
                                                        
59 For a summary of the debates, see Benny Tai, “The Chief Executive”, in J Chan 
& C L Lim (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 
2015), Ch 7, at paras 7.013-7.021. 
60 Leung Kwok Hung v President of Legislative Council of the HKSAR, HCAL 
87/2006; Raza v Chief Executive of the HKSAR [2008] 3 HKLRD 561; Society for 
the Protection of the Harbour v Chief Executive in Council (No 2) [2004] 2 HKLRD 
902.  
61 Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4. 
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Thirdly, the courts would be reluctant to interfere with the internal 
operation of the Legislative Council.  There were a number of occasions where 
the exercise of powers of the Legislative Council was challenged, not only by 
members of the public, but also by members of the Legislative Council.  In Chim 
Pui Chung v President of Legislative Council,62 a legislator who was convicted and 
sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment, challenged the order of the President of the 
Legislative Council to put on the agenda a motion to disqualify him under art 
79(6) of the Basic Law on the ground that “conviction” and “sentence” under Art 
79(6) referred to a final order of conviction and sentence after the appeal has 
been exhausted.  The application was refused without entering into the question 
of jurisdiction.  In Leung Kwok Hung v Clerk to the Legislative Council,63 the 
applicant, who was newly elected to the Legislative Council, applied for a 
declaration that he was free to devise his own form of oath of office so long as the 
essence of the original oath was retained.  His application for leave was refused 
on the ground that the legislation did not permit a departure from the statutory 
language of the oath without again entering into the question of jurisdiction.  In 
another case of Leung Kwok Hung v President of the Legislative Council,64 the 
applicant challenged the ruling of the President of the Legislative Council to 
disallow him to move an amendment on the basis that it has the object or effect 
of disposing of or charging part of the revenue.  He invited the court to grant a 
declaration that the relevant Rule of the Legislative Council contravened Art 
73(1) of the Basic Law.  The application failed on the ground that the remedy 
was not reasonably arguable.   It was noteworthy that the court was not invited 
to intervene in any internal procedure of the Legislative Council or to pronounce 
on the legality of the decision of the President.  Hartmann J sounded the caution 
that while the court has jurisdiction to intervene, this jurisdiction, having regard 
to the doctrine of separation of powers and the sovereignty of the Legislative 
Council under the Basic Law, should only be exercised in a restrictive manner.65 
 
 In Cheng Kar Shun v Li Fung Ying,66 the applicant, who was a major real 
estate developer, challenged the power of a committee of the Legislative Council 
to summons witness in an investigation under art 73(10) of the Basic Law.  It 
was argued that this power could only be exercised by the Legislative Council 
and not by one of its committees.  For the first time, leave to apply for judicial 
review of the practice of the Legislative Council was granted.  It is significant that 
the court was invited to intervene in an on-going proceeding of the Legislative 
Council.  The application was ultimately dismissed on ground of statutory 
interpretation.  The question of jurisdiction was not argued. 
 
Finally, in a further case of Leung Kwok Hung v President of Legislative 
Council,67 also known as the filibustering case, the Court of Final Appeal set out 
clearly the relationship between the courts and the Legislative Council.  In that 
                                                        
62 [1998] 2 HKLRD 552. 
63 HCAL 112/2004. 
64 [2007] 1 HKLRD 387. 
65 Ibid, at 397, para 31. 
66 [2011] 2 HKLRD 555. 
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case, the issue was the legality of the ruling of the President of Legislative 
Council to cut short and close a debate.  Having regard to the doctrine of 
separation of powers, the court held that whether the President has the power to 
terminate a debate was a matter for the court, but whether the power was 
properly exercised would be a matter for the Legislative Council.  In general, the 
court shall not intervene in the internal procedure of the Legislative Council.  It is 
for the Legislative Council to decide how it would like to make and apply its own 
rules to deal with the problem of filibustering, and the courts, in a system of 
separation of powers, should respect the sovereignty of the Legislative Council in 
this regard. 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers is not set out in the text of the Basic 
Law.  It was even politically controversial whether this principle was embodied 
in the Basic Law.  Nonetheless, it is clearly an invisible constitutional principle in 
operation that has guided or influenced the courts in all these cases. 
 
 
V. From Proportionality to Manifestly without Reasonable Foundation: 
Prevalence of Civil and Political Rights over Social and Economic Rights 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers is also seen to be in operation in the 
context of social and economic rights.  Chapter 3 of the Basic Law is titled 
Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents, in which it sets out a list of 
fundamental rights.  Among them include both civil and political rights as well as 
social and economic rights, culminated in the important Article 39 which 
provides that no restriction of rights and freedoms shall contravene the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR as applied to Hong Kong and implemented through the laws of 
HKSAR.  This chapter is not exhaustive of all fundamental rights, as the right to 
fair trial and the right to jury trial are provided in the chapter dealing with the 
Judiciary, whereas the right to property is protected in the chapter on Economy.  
While there is nothing in the Basic Law to suggest that there is a hierarchy 
among different types of rights, the courts have, through a series of decisions on 
proportionality, reached a stage that not all rights are of equal status. 
 
The starting point is that in a civil society, the courts will vigilantly 
protect fundamental rights and freedoms and vigorously scrutinize any 
restriction on them. Any restriction will have to satisfy the legality and the 
proportionality tests.  The proportionality test embraces the twin facets that the 
restriction bears a rational relationship to and does not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives to be pursued. In developing the 
proportionality test, the courts soon adopt and modify the concept of a margin of 
appreciation to domestic law.  In its original conception, this notion legitimizes 
an international tribunal to defer to the States in determining whether restrictive 
measures are necessary on the ground that domestic institutions are in a much 
better and more informed position to evaluate particular local needs and 
conditions.  Formulated in this way, the concept has no place in domestic law, as 
it is not open to a local judge to claim unfamiliarity with local needs and 
conditions.  However, the concept was soon modified to justify a degree of 
deference to the Executive Government or Legislature in recognition of their 
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expertise, information advantage or constitutional roles.  Thus, in Lau Cheong v 
HKSAR, the Court of Final Appeal held that whether mandatory life 
imprisonment replacing mandatory death sentence was a necessary and 
proportionate response to murder was a highly charged political decision which 
the court should defer to the Legislature.68  While the doctrine of deference is 
justified on the dual grounds of expertise/competence and constitutional roles, 
the court is less prepared to defer to the executive or the Legislature if the 
ground of deference is based on a mere lack of expertise.  Thus, in Kwok Kay 
Kwong v Medical Council of Hong Kong,69 it was argued that the Courts should 
defer to the judgment and expertise of the Medical Council who was in a better 
position to determine what kind of restriction on professional advertising by 
doctors would be necessary.  Yet the Court of Final Appeal was prepared to 
subject the justifications to a searching scrutiny and eventually overrode the 
judgment of the Medical Council primarily because the decision involved free 
speech.   
 
In contrast, the Court readily extended the concept to social and economic 
rights by adopting a new standard of manifestly without reasonable foundations.  
It readily accepted that allocation of resources in the context of socio-economic 
policies was a matter for the executive government so that a less vigorous 
scrutiny would be justified.  Thus, in Fok Chun-wa v Hospital Authority,70 the 
Court held that in the context of allocation of limited public funds, the 
Government should be left to decide whether to have any social welfare scheme, 
and if so, its extent and who should benefit thereunder.  It was not for the court 
to find an alternative solution and the courts would intervene only if the 
impugned measure had clearly transgressed beyond the range of alternatives.  In 
that case, the issue was whether a differential and higher fee for obstetric service 
for non-Hong Kong residents could be justified.  The differential fee regime was 
introduced to discourage Mainland pregnant mothers from giving birth in Hong 
Kong, as such incidents, due to their sheer number, have caused considerable 
anxieties and strains in obstetric service and hospital resources for Hong Kong 
pregnant mothers.  The Court of Final Appeal found that a distinction based on 
residence status was entirely within the spectrum of reasonableness and that the 
measure was not discriminatory, taking into account, among other things, the 
need to ensure the sustainability of providing subsidized health services and the 
entitlement to subsidized health service not being a fundamental right. 
 
The idea that social and economic rights are not fundamental rights has 
been expressed in some earlier cases.  In Chan Mei Yee v Director of Immigration, 
Hartmann J held that social and economic rights were promotional and 
aspirational in nature and hence the ICESCR did not create any legally 
enforceable obligations.71  This has attracted a rebuke from the Social, 
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71 HCAL 77/1999, 13 July 2000.  See also Chan To Foon v Director of Immigration 
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Economics and Cultural Committee in its concluding observation on the Initial 
Periodic Report on the HKSAR.  The Committee, in unusually strong language, 
“regrets” such views, which were “based on a mistaken understanding of the 
legal obligations arising from the Covenant” and urged the Government not to 
repeat similar views in judicial proceedings.72  In reply, the Government stated 
that “we note the Committee’s observation that the Covenant is not merely 
‘promotional’ or ‘aspirational’ in nature and accept that it creates binding 
obligations at the international level.”73 
 
While the Government’s reply was ambiguous as to its stance on social 
and economic rights at domestic level, it did refrain from arguing that social and 
economic rights are aspirational or promotional in nature in subsequent legal 
proceedings.  Instead, it urged, and to a large extent successful, the courts to 
afford a wide margin of appreciation to the Government whenever social and 
economic rights were engaged.  The courts responded by developing the concept 
of manifestly without reasonable foundation, and in so doing, drew a distinction 
between cases involving socio-economic policies and cases involving 
fundamental rights or core values.   Thus, in Kong Yunming v Director of Social 
Welfare, the Court of Final Appeal laid down a three-tier test:74 
 
“In some cases involving fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression or freedom of peaceful assembly, or rights bearing on criminal 
liability such as the presumption of innocence, the Court has regarded the 
restriction as disproportionate unless it goes no further than necessary to 
achieve the legitimate objective in question.  This is sometimes called the 
“minimal impairment” test.   
 
Similarly, in discrimination cases, where the differentiating inroad is 
based on certain personal characteristics sometimes referred to as 
‘inherently suspected grounds’ such as race, colour, sex or sexual 
orientation, the Court will subject the impugned measure to ‘intense 
scrutiny’, requiring weighty evidence that it goes no further than 
necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question. 
 
However, it would not usually be within the province of the courts to 
adjudicate on the merits or demerits of government socio-economic 
policies.  Where the disputed measure involves implementation of the 
Government’s socio-economic policy choices regarding the allocation of 
limited public funds without impinging upon fundamental rights, or 
involving possible discrimination on inherently suspect grounds, the 
Court has held that it has a duty to intervene only where the impugned 
measure is ‘manifestly without reasonable justification’.” 
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In short, a less vigorous scrutiny will be adopted in assessing the 
proportionality of any measures restricting social and economic rights because 
“the art 36 right to social welfare is not a fundamental right but a right which 
intrinsically involves the Government setting rules determining eligibility and 
benefit levels.”75   In so doing, the courts equated social and economic rights with 
socio-economic policies and reinforced the second-class nature of social and 
economic rights.  This approach is largely influenced by the courts’ perception of 
separation of powers, namely that allocation of resources in socio-economic 
policies falls within the domain of executive prerogatives. 
 
Notwithstanding its rhetoric on social and economic rights, the Court of 
Final Appeal in Kong Yunming did, to the surprise of many observers, adopt a 
rather vigorous scrutiny of the restriction on the right to social welfare and 
reversed unanimously the decisions of the lower courts.  In that case, the issue 
was whether an extension of the eligibility residence requirement from 1 year to 
7 years for comprehensive social welfare assistance was a violation of the right 
to social welfare under Art 36 of the Basic Law.  The Government relied on the 
familiar argument that the extension was necessary to ensure the sustainability 
of the social welfare system.  The Court, however, subjected this argument to 
vigorous examination of evidence.  It found that the restriction was inconsistent 
with the family reunion policy and the population policy, that the extension was 
illogical as young children was exempted but not their parents, resulting in 
children without parental care or young children having to share their welfare 
assistance with their parents.  It also found that the seven-year residence 
requirement was in fact targeted at the new arrivals from the Mainland, and the 
Government failed to substantiate the claim of sustainability when only 12-15% 
of the expense was attributable to the new arrivals.  The Court examined closely 
the Government’s budget, the breakdown of the expenditure on CSSA as revealed 
in the Legislative Council paper, various statistics and reports provided by the 
Government, and concluded that there was no rational connection between the 
justification of sustainability of the welfare system and the 7-year residence 
requirement, and that the 7-year residence requirement was a restriction on the 
Applicant’s right to social welfare that was manifestly without reasonable 
foundation. 
 
The approach of the court was exemplary of a vigorous scrutiny of 
restriction on a fundamental right.  It casts doubt on any real difference between 
the minimal impairment test and the manifestly without reasonable foundation 
test, which, on its face, is reminiscent of the more conservative Wednesbury 
unreasonableness test in the common law.76  To that extent it is a welcome 
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development.  On the other hand, it would be too early to conclude that this case 
marks the dawn of a new era for social and economic rights and that the court is 
prepared to acknowledge social and economic rights as a fundamental right that 
is on par with civil and political rights.  The Court itself was cautious in pointing 
out that the right to social welfare was not a fundamental right, that it was 
dealing with a  scheme to provide “safety net  needs”, and that its decision may 
not apply to other forms of social welfare.77  Its approach may well be 
conditioned by the special facts in that case.78  
 
Indeed, shortly after, the Court seems to have resorted once again to the 
inferior nature of social and economic rights.  In the more recent case of GA v 
Director of Immigration, the issue was whether the applicants, who were 
screened-in torture claimant and mandated refugees, were entitled to work 
when they have been in Hong Kong for 10-13 years and when there was no 
reasonable prospect of their resettlement in a foreign country.79  The Court of 
Final Appeal held that they could not rely on either the ICCPR or the Bill of Rights 
because of an effective reservation on immigration decisions.  Insofar as the right 
to work in Art 6 of the ICESCR is concerned, the Government accepted that while 
there was no general domestic law that has given effect to the ICESCR, Art 6 has 
been implemented in domestic law through various provisions in the Basic Law 
and provisions in over 50 ordinances.  Notwithstanding this concession, the 
Court held that there was no general, unrestricted right to work.  The most that 
can be said is that “there is some allowance made for persons like the Applicants 
to be permitted to work, but this is far from the general, unrestricted right which 
is said to exist.”80   This is a regrettably narrow view of the right to work.  In the 
first place, the right to work may be regarded as a right to freely enter into a 
contract of employment, which is well recognized in the common law.  Secondly, 
a right to work does not mean an absolute right to work.  It is subject to 
restrictions that are necessary and proportionate.  Framed in this way, the issue 
would then be whether the restrictions imposed by the Director of Immigration 
not to allow the applicants to work were proportionate.  This would allow the 
court to examine the substance of the issue and balance the competing 
considerations.  Unfortunately, by rejecting that there is a right to work, the 
court found it even unnecessary to consider whether the Director of Immigration 
should exercise his discretion in a manner consistent with treaty obligations 
under the ICESCR on the basis that the ICESCR was not incorporated into 
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domestic law – a reminiscence that the ICESCR is aspirational and promotional in 
nature! 
 
The upshot of this line of cases reveals an increasingly restrictive stance 
towards the rights of aliens.  It has first been held that illegal immigrants from 
the Mainland had no legitimate expectation to a right to fair hearing and that the 
Director of Immigration had no duty to consider humanitarian grounds.81  It was 
then held that there was no discrimination to subject an alien mother from the 
Mainland to a differential and higher fee for public health service.82  In another 
case it upheld the constitutionality of a provision in the Immigration Ordinance 
that denied foreign domestic helpers ordinary residence in Hong Kong no matter 
how long they have stayed in Hong Kong.83  Then it was held that there was no 
right to work for mandated refugees or screened-in torture claimants even when 
they had stayed in Hong Kong for over 12 years with no reasonable prospect of 
resettlement in another country.84 
 
Do these cases foreshadow a reversal of the liberal trend towards 
treatment of fundamental rights?  The original conception of separation of 
powers that the Government is abide by law has gradually given way to another 
conception of separation of powers that the courts should defer to the 
Legislature or the Executive Government when it involves the constitutional 
competence of another branch of government.  This is witnessed by the adoption 
of the manifestly without reasonable foundation test even in civil and political 
rights.  In Kwok Cheuk Kin v Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs,85 
the Court of Appeal re-interpreted the three-tier test adopted in Kong Yunming. 
In that case, the issue was whether a prohibition against a legislator who has 
resigned from the Legislature from taking part in the by-election for the vacant 
seat that was created by his resignation was a proportionate restriction on the 
right to vote.  The restriction was a response to the attempt of some Legislators 
who tried to seek popular mandate and force an effective referendum on a 
controversial issue by resignation and then taking part in the by-election on a 
single-issue platform.  While the right to stand for election is no doubt a civil and 
political right, the Court of Appeal held that: 
  
 “Properly read, in Kong Yunming, Ribeiro PJ applied the proportionality 
test and he was only referring to the difference in the intensity and 
standard of review in the application of the third limb of that test 
(proportionate restriction).” (para 28) 
 
By reinterpreting the test in Kong Yunming, the Court of Appeal held that 
there was only one proportionality test and there was no separate minimal 
impairment test, thereby eschewing the difference between civil and political 
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rights and social and economic rights.  It maintained the test of manifestly 
without reasonable foundations for social and economic rights, but then decided 
to adopt the same test, or at least a wide margin of appreciation in favour of the 
Government, for the right to stand for election on the ground that the issue was 
political in nature. The application for judicial review failed.86 
 
The reluctance of the courts to intervene in the allocation of public 
resources has long been recognized in the common law and could be traced back 
to the doctrine of separation of powers.  This attitude manifested itself in the 
treatment of social and economic rights in the Basic Law, when the Basic Law 
itself has not drawn any such distinction.  It has led the courts to develop a 
different notion of proportionality test, namely a test of manifestly without 
reasonable foundations, and the test was then extended even to the right to 
stand for election on the ground that the issue was political.  The doctrine of 
separation of powers is not explicit, but it is certainly in operation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Hong Kong is not an independent state.  Under the One Country, Two Systems 
model, it has to operate within a country that has adopted a fundamentally 
different legal, social and political system.  It is a precarious model that rests 
heavily on the goodwill of the PRC. At the time of the Joint Declaration, Hong 
Kong was already a modern metropolis with great economic success, and was 
responsible for almost 90% of foreign incomes of the PRC.  Thirty years later, 
China has emerged as the second largest economic power in the world, with 
Hong Kong responsible for only less than 3% of its GDP. Yet economic progress 
in the Mainland is not matched by its development of the rule of law, which still 
flourishes in Hong Kong.  Over the years, Hong Kong has been subject to 
increasing social, economic and political influences from the Mainland.  The rule 
of law, which embodies the independence of the judiciary, is probably the only 
aspect that distinguishes the two systems now.  Thus, it is not surprising that the 
courts are trying very hard to preserve the integrity of the common law system 
and in particular, the objective and perceived independence of the judiciary, but 
at the same time, carefully restrain the exercise of their power.  
 
In preserving the integrity of the common law system, the courts also try 
to preserve the previous systems, be it the health system, the education system, 
regulations of civil service, or the social welfare system.  The promise of One 
Country, Two Systems is to last for at least 50 years.  This promise could only be 
realized if the essence of the previous system is preserved.  At the same time, the 
courts have to ensure that this would not fossilize the previous systems and 
allow them to evolve with changing social and economic conditions. 
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A challenging issue for the courts is the changing relationship of the three 
branches of government.  The rule of law mandates the subjection of 
Government acts to the principle of legality.  At the same time, the power of 
constitutional review, which the Court of Final Appeal managed to claim, 
requires the court to respect the sovereignty of the two other branches of 
government.  In this sense, the doctrine of separation of powers goes hand in 
hand with the power of constitutional review.  The influences of the doctrine of 
separation of powers under this new regime of constitutional review could be 
seen, not only in delineating the relations between the judiciary and the 
Legislature in judicial review of the functioning of the Legislative Council, but 
also in the deference to the Government and the Legislature in reviewing 
restrictions of social and economic rights. 
 
None of these principles can be found explicitly in the text of the Basic 
Law.  Yet it is also clear that they have been in operation and in influencing 
judicial decisions.  Whether they are just distinct constitutional principles or 
fixed stars that punctuate in the night sky that could form a pattern of 
constitutional constellation remains to be seen.87  It is probably too early to find 
an invisible constitutional pattern behind the text in a constitution of barely 25 
years old.  Yet it is clear that there are at least some fundamental principles that 
lie behind the text.  Preservation of the existing system is promised up to the 
year 2047.  The system thereafter remains an open question at this stage, and 
will probably have to be decided at the latest in around the year 2030.88   In 
exploring the future in the not too distant future, there is a practical, if not also 
imperative, dimension for Hong Kong to identify any invisible constitutional 
fundamentals.  This paper provides a modest attempt to do so.  
 
 
 
********** 
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